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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

MARY ANN LUCERO
DIPOMA,
Plaintiff, Appellant
and Respondent,
vs.

CaseNo.2000466-SC
Priority No. 12

BRIAN McPHIE and DOES I
through 20, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE UNKNOWN,
Defendant, Appellee
and Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Was the Utah Court of Appeals correct infindingthat payment of a
filing fee is not a jurisdictional requirement for determining when an action is
commenced for purposes of a statute of limitation defense when Dipoma
timelyfiledher Complaint and paid thefilingfee with a personal check which
was later dishonored?
2. Was the Utah Court of Appeals correct in refusing tofindthe
actions of Dipoma with regard to payment of the check to be unreasonable as

a matter of law when there was no evidence in the record at the trial court
concerning this issue and where the defendant failed to raise the issue in the
trial court?
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES TO THIS APPEAL
This appeal involves the interpretation of a number of statutes and civil
rules which are currently in effect and, in some instances, repealed. These
include statutes relating to limitation of actions,filingfee collections by
government agents, and civil rules relating to commencing a civil action and
appealing a civil judgment. These applicable statutes and rules are as
follows:
Statutes Relating to Limitation of Actions
78-12-1 - Time for Commencement of Action Generally. Civil
actions may be commenced only within the period prescribed in
this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in
specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by
statute.
78-12-75 - An action may be brought within four years: (1)
upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing...
Statutes Relating to Filing Fees
21-1-1 - For services performed in their respective offices, the
officers named in this chapter shall collect in advance for the use
and benefit of the state the fees hereinafter enumerated and such
other fees as may be provided by law.
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21-l-5(l)(a) - The fee forfilingany civil complaint or petition
invoking the jurisdiction of a court of record not governed by
another subsection is $120.
21-7-2(l)(a) - The state and county officers mentioned in this
title may not perform any official service unless the fees
prescribed for that service are paid in advance.
(b) When the fee is paid, the officer shall perform the services
required.
(c) An officer is liable upon his official bond for every failure or
refusal to perform an official duty when the fees are tendered.
21-7-3(2) - As provided in this chapter, any person may institute,
prosecute, defend, and appeal any cause in any court in this state
without prepayment of fees and costs or security, by taking an
subscribing, before any officer authorized to administer an oath,
an affidavit of impecuniosity demonstrating financial inability to
pay fees and costs or give security.
21-7-4(1) - Upon thefilingof the oath or affirmation with any
Utah court by a non-prisoner, the court shall review the affidavit
and make an independent determination based on the
information provided whether court costs and fees should be
waived entirely or in part. Notwithstanding the party's
statement of inability to pay court costs, the court shall require a
partial or full filing fee where thefinancialinformation provided
demonstrates an ability to pay a fee.
In the instances where fees or costs are completely waived, the
court shall immediately file any complaint or papers on appeal
and do what is necessary or proper as promptly as if the litigant
had fully paid all the regular fees. The constable or sheriff shall
immediately serve any summonses, writs, processes, and
subpoenas, and papers necessary or proper in the prosecution or
defense of the cause, for the impecunious person as if all the
necessary fees and costs had been fully paid.
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21-7-4.6(1) - When an affidavit of impecuniosity has been filed
and the court assesses an initial filing fee, the court shall
immediately notify the litigant in writing of:
(a) The initialfilingfee required as a prerequisite to
proceeding with the action;
(b) The procedure available to challenge the initial filing
fee assessment as provided in Section 21-7-4.7; and
(c) The inmate's ongoing obligation to make monthly
payments until the entirefilingfee is paid.
(2) The court may not authorize service of process or otherwise
proceed with the action, except as provided in Section 21-7-4.7,
until the initialfilingfees have been completely paid to the clerk
of the court.
21-7-4.7(1) - Within ten days of receiving court notice requiring
an initialfilingfee under Section 21-7-4.6, the litigant may
contest the fee assessment byfilinga memorandum and
supporting documentation with the court demonstrating inability
to pay the fee.
(2) The court shall review the memorandum the supporting
documents challenging the fee assessment for facial validity.
(3) The court may reduce the initialfilingfee, authorize service
of process, or otherwise proceed with the action without
prepayment of costs and fees if the memorandum show the
litigant:
(a) Has lost his source of income;
(b) Has unaccounted nondiscretionary expenses limiting
his ability to pay;
(c) Will suffer immediate irreparable harm if the action is
unnecessarily delayed; or
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(d) Will otherwise lose the cause of action by unnecessary
delays associated with securing funds necessary to
satisfy the assessedfilingfee.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the
litigantfromthe ongoing obligation of monthly payments until
thefilingfee is paid in fall.
Rules Relating To Commencement Of Civil
Actions And Appeals.
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
A. How Commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) byfilinga
complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a copy
of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4. If the action is commenced by
the service of a summons and a copy of the complaint, then the complaint, the
summons and proof of service, must befiledwithin ten days of such service.
If, in a case commenced under paragraph A(2) of this rule, the complaint,
summons, and proof of service are notfiledwithin ten days of service, the
action commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no
further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that the foregoing provision
shall not change the requirement of Utah Code Annotated, $12-1-8 (1986).
B. Time of Jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdictionfromthe time
offilingof the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the
complaint.
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
A. Filing Appeal From Final Orders and Judgments. An appeal may
be takenfroma district or juvenile court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appealfromallfinalorders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, byfilinga notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timelyfilingof a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney's fees.
3

* * *

(f) At the time offilingany notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in
a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the
trial court suchfilingfees as are established by law, and also the fee
for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk of the trial
court shall not accept the notice of appeal unless thefilingand
docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of Appeal. Upon thefilingof the notice of appeal and
payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the
date of itsfiling,the docketing fee . . . to the clerk of the appellate
court. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and
docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal
upon the docket.
Former Rule 73, Rules of Civil Procedure prior to amendment in 1985:
* * *

A party may appealfroma judgment byfilingwith the district court
a notice of appeal, together with sufficient copies thereof for
mailing to the supreme court and all other parties to the judgment,
and depositing therewith the fee required for docketing the appeal in
the Supreme Court. The clerk of the district court shall forthwith
transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of filing,
together with the required fee, to the Supreme Court where the
appeal shall be duly docketed. Failure of the appellant to take any
of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is only ground
for such remedies as are specified in this Rule, or when no remedy
is specified, for such action as the Supreme Court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.

$

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent takes exception to a distortion of the record contained in
the "Statement of the Case" of the petitioner. (Brief of Petitioner at 2-4).
Petitioner states:
Dipoma's personal check was returned to the Clerk of the Court
on December 29,1997. (R. 16-17,21). The Clerk of the Court
notified Dipoma of the insufficient funds check shortly thereafter and
told Dipoma that the Clerk could not accept additional checksfromher
as herfirstcheck had been returned. (R. 16-17, 21). After waiting
over two more months, Dipoma attempted to pay thefilingfee on
March 10,1998 by mailing another check to the Clerk of the Court (R.
21,29-30). (Petitioner's Brief at 2).
In fact, as the Court of Appeals noted, "the record does not disclose
when the Court Clerk notified Dipoma that her check had been returned."
This same effort of Petitioner to distort the record facts to paint a picture of
lack of diligence on Dipoma's part was attempted in the briefs with the Court
of Appeals and was specifically noted in the Reply Brief of Dipoma in that
proceeding. (Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 1-2).
Petitioner has omitted to note that during the proceeding in the trial
court no effort was made by Petitioner McPhie to establish factual evidence
as to the reasonableness of Dipoma's actions with regard to the payment of
thefilingfee. The question of reasonableness was never argued nor briefed
in the lower court nor ruled upon by the trial judge. The sole basis of the
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lower court's opinion was that the subsequent dishonor of Dipoma's check as
a matter of law voided an otherwise timelyfilingof the complaint and thus
was not within the applicable four-year statute of limitations.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Before an action can be dismissed under a statute of limitations, there
must be a clear showing that a litigant has not "commenced" a legal
proceeding against the adverse party. In this case an actual complaint was
filed with the Clerk of the Court, a case number was assigned to the litigation,
and a trial judge was designated. It is undisputed that the date this action was
filed satisfied the four-year statute of limitations. This appeal arose because
Dipoma's personal check for thefilingfee was subsequently returned by her
bank and the fee was not collected by the Clerk of the Court until after the
four-year statute of limitation had run.
The Court of Appeals found that thefilingof the complaint and receipt
of a valid case number properly "commences the action" under Rule 3 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of the statute of limitations regardless
of the status of thefilingfee. Because this specific rule governing the
commencement of a lawsuit does not require a fee to be paid for jurisdiction
to attach, any general statutes relating to the duties of government officers is
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not jurisdictional for purposes of determining whether an action is within an
applicable statute of limitation.
Moreover, even if it were assumed arguendo that a filing fee was
jurisdictionally required the tender of a lawful check would satisfy this
requirement since the legislature has never required a cash payment for any
filing fee. The fact that a check is later dishonored is no different that
allowing a person claiming to be impecunious to file a complaint even though
later it is determined that no impecuniosity claim can be made. In both cases
any filing fee requirement has been initially satisfied.
The alternate grounds argued by the petitioner for the first time before
the Court of Appeals is not a proper issue to this appeal. The question of
"reasonableness" must always be based upon a full factual record even in
those cases decided as a matter of law. The issue of "reasonableness" cannot
be decided on a non-existent record where no evidence was taken. The
petitioner McPhie had the opportunity to develop such a record in the lower
court and to raise this issue as an alternate ground in the lower court
proceeding but for whatever reason chose not to do so. It was therefore
proper for the Court of Appeals to reject this ground since it was not raised
by Petitioner on appeal and because the lower court could not have decided
this issue without a factual record of Dipoma's actions or inaction.
9

The "sky is falling" argument advanced by Petitioner McPhie are
totally without merit. This decision focused upon a very specific issue
involving a dishonored check and a statute of limitation defense. The Court of
Appeals did not hold that district court clerks would no longer be required to
collect fees under the general statutory provisions of Title 21. Nor did the
Court hold that a payment of afilingfee was not necessary if a litigant wishes
to utilize the court system of Utah. Instead, the Court merely held that for
purposes of determining when an action is "commenced" pursuant to Rule 3
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the payment of afilingfee is not
prerequisite in order for jurisdiction of the courts to attach. The decision
clearly did not excuse thefilingfee requirement imposed by statute.
Furthermore, the argument that court clerks will become overburdened
collection agents is equally without merit. Until such time as the State of
Utah requires cash payment for all state statutory fees there will always be a
problem with collecting dishonored checks or rejected credit card
authorizations. However, as was illustrated in this case, the clerks in the
District Courts are fully prepared to deal with this problem just like every
other public and private agency which transacts business with the public.
Specific penalty fees are added to dishonored checks, criminal provisions
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apply tofraudulentchecks, and courts arefreeto dismiss actions at any time
when payment had not been made.
Finally, the attempt by Petitioner McPhie to expand the decision of the
Court of Appeals and the issue in this case to all state government agencies is
completely nonsensical. This decision did not deal with the validity of fees
paid to other government agencies by dishonored checks. Certainly, it is
patently clear that there is no critical issue ofjurisdictional commencement of
the fee for a hunting license, document recording fee, or birth certificate. All
of the various state agencies appropriately require payment for their services
and appropriately deal with any collection problems that may subsequently
arise with a minute percentage.
ARGUMENT
Respondent Dipomafollyadopts the reasoning of the majority opinion
by the Court of Appeals below. A copy of this decision is contained in the
Appendix to this Brief. This decision succinctly analyzes and resolves the
problem presented in this particular case involving these particular litigants.
Respondent Dipoma would feel comfortable relying solely upon the wellreasoned principles enunciated by the Court of Appeals were it not for the
post-opinion arguments raised by Petitioner McPhie before this Court
concerning alleged catastrophic consequences that were never argued below.
11

For this reason, therefore, respondent Dipoma will supplement the
opinion of the Court of Appeals as to the precise issue of this litigation and
will also address the broad predictions of mayhem now argued by McPhie
before this Court.
I.
FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING A STATUE
OF LIMITATION PERIOD AN ACTION IS
"COMMENCED" BY THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
A FILING FEE IS PAID OR NOT.
As is often the case, this appeal does not concern the actual automobile
accident in which Plaintiff was severely injured. Instead, it focuses on the
effect of a returnedfilingfee check which was used by the respondent
Dipoma to enter the Utah court system to enforce her legal rights. It is not
unusual for checks to be dishonored in Utah on any given day for a variety of
reasons both within the control of the check writer and beyond the control of
the check writer. This non-event of a returned check would have had no
significance in this litigation had it not been for the unique fact that Dipoma
did not choose to use this check until shortly before the statute of limitation
was to expire. Thus, just as a razor thin presidential election has now given
tremendous significance to the previously unknown terms of "hanging chad,"
"pregnant chad," and "dimpled chad" the coincidence of the statute of
12

limitation and the dishonored check has created a lawsuit in and of itself.
These unlikely combinations of events is what creates history and appellate
decisions.
Before arguing what this case is about it is important to note what it is
not about. First, this case only concerns thefilingof a judicial complaint. It
does not involve any other type of government agency or attempt to utilize
any other government service.
Second, this is not a case in which respondent Dipoma asserted that
she could commence this lawsuit without paying a filing fee. She did not go
to the counter of the District Court Clerk and demand that the clerkfilethe
action with no payment of fees. Similarly, this is not a case in which a clerk
forgot to request a fee to be paid by Dipoma before the matter was stamped
and assigned to a lower court judge. Rather, it is a case in which all normal
requirements forfilingof a complaint were complied with by Dipoma
including presentation of a valid check drawn upon her personal account
which was accepted by the clerk in the regular course of business.
Finally, this is not a case in which Dipoma has claimed that by some
statutory or constitutional reason she should not pay the required filing fee to
utilize the court systems of this state. In fact, thefilingfee was paid well
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before any effort was made by the petitioner McPhie to dismiss this entire
action.
The sole issue raised by petitioner McPhie in the trial court was
whether the sequence of events concerning the payment of thefilingfee
allowed him to assert an affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. That
was and is the only issue now before this Court in spite of petitioner
McPhie's efforts to expand the ruling by the Court of Appeals to encompass
an entire rainbow of unreal issues. With this in mind, therefore, respondent
Dipoma will now specifically address the actual issue of this appeal.
For purposes of analyzing a statute of limitation case the critical
question becomes whether a civil action has been "commenced" within the
applicable allowed time. $78-12-1, U.C.A. In the instant case, for example,
a four-year period is allowed to commence an action involving a tort. $7812-75, U.C.A. It is apparent that the term "commenced" contained in the
statute of limitation sections of the Utah Code specifically refer to Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There it is stated, "a civil action is
commenced (1) byfilinga complaint with the court or (2) by service of a
summons together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4."
(Emphasis added). Moreover, subsection (b) states, "The court shall have
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jurisdictionfromthe time offilingof the complaint or service of the summons
and a copy of the complaint."
Another provision of Utah law also supports Dipoma's position. Rule
4(c)(2) states, "If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons
shall state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed
within ten days after service . . . . " Thus, under the Utah rules the time for
measuring a statute of limitation defense can occur upon the service of a
summons with thefilingand payment not occurring for up to ten days later.
Obviously, both Rules 3 and 4 are written with exact detail which must
be followed if an action is to be correctly commenced. Failure to do so will
result in lack ofjurisdiction. Lock v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1955);
Martin v.Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288
(Utah 1986); Dennett v. Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975); and Fibreboard
Paper Products v. Ditrich. 475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970). Certainly, the
jurisdictional requirement of afilingfee could easily have been included in
Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure if it was in fact required.
Because petitioner McPhie is unable to use the judicial code or the
Rules of Civil Procedure to assist him in his jurisdictional argument, he
attempts to rely on Title 21 of the Utah Code relating to government fees in
order to support his claim. Sections 21-1-1 and 21-7-2(l)(a) require clerks to
15

collect fees in advance and not to perform any services until such fees are
paid. It should be noted, however, that there is no language in these
categories of statutes relating to jurisdiction of a court in relation to these
fees. As noted by the Supreme Court of Kansas "since payment of the docket
fee affects only the clerk of the district court, and an adverse party is not
affected by the time of the payment of the docket fee, it should not be
regarded as jurisdictional." Avco Financial Services v. Caldwell. 547 P.2d
756, 760 (Kan. 1976).
In Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. DiAntonio, 618
A.2d 1182 (Pa. 1992), the clerk of the court known as a "prothonotary"
accepted an answer although an insufficient amount had been tendered. The
opposing party argued that even though the answer was properly date
stamped andfiled,the failure to pay the correct amount voided the answer
and therefore allowed a default to be entered. The opposing party relied upon
the same type of statutory requirement that clerks were not supposed to
accept documents unless the correct fee was paid. The Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania rejected this argument and stated:
DiAntonio contends that because SEPTA did not pay the proper
filing fee, thefilingwas not perfected and the prothonotary was not
required to docket the answer. Section 4 of the Act does provide that
the prothonotary of Philadelphia County "shall not be required to
receive any papers or perform any service until the proper fee is paid."
16

Although the prothonotary was not required to accept the
pleading until the proper fee was paid, the prothonotary accepted the
answer by time stamping a copy. These actions constitute "filing",
which although not defined in the Rules of Civil Procedure, commonly
refers to the delivery of papers to the prothonotary for docketing....
Even though the prothonotary's office later discovered that the total fee
was deficient, the prothonotary could not summarily return the answer
after having accepted it.
Consequently, SEPTA's answer was deemedfiledon April 12,
1981, the day it was accepted by the prothonotary as indicated by the
original time stamp, and the answer should have been timely docketed.
To decide otherwise would eliminate reasonable reliance by parties on
a prothonotary's acceptance of a pleading. Id. at 1185.
An argument similar to Petitioner's was made in Foley v. Foley, 147
Cal. App.2d 76 (Cal. App. 1956). A California statute required clerks to
collect fees in advance. A litigant failed to pay afilingfee timely but the
clerk still accepted the papers andfiledthem. The fees were not paid until
after the statutory period had expired forfilingof the original papers.
The California Appellate Court found thefilingdate effective everf
though the fee was not paid within the statutory period. The Court
emphasized there was no indication that the legislature intended thefilingbe
rendered void if thefilingfee was not timely paid. The Court said:
If it had been the legislative intent that the effectiveness of
certain official acts would depend on the payment of fees by the
persons interested in them, a provision directed to those interested
persons and in our case contained in the Code of Civil Procedure
would have been expected. Id. at 78.
17

It is interesting that the research of both parties to this litigation has
found only one decisionfromthe vast courts of America dealing with the
question of whether the timely filing of a complaint andfilingfee by check
"commences" an action for purposes of a statute of limitation defense when
the check is later dishonored and subsequently paid after the statute of
limitation time has expired. The Colorado Court of Appeals case of
Brokerhouse International v. Bendelow is cited and quoted by the petitioner
McPhie in his brief. (9-11). This case was noted by the Court of Appeals in
the majority opinion. (Appendix p. 3, f 21). Respondent Dipoma would
submit that a review of this half-page decision relating to this issue does not
clarify the question of "payment" at all but is merely a legal conclusion
without any analysis. In essence, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined
that the payment of afilingfee only occurs when cash is received by the
clerk.
No other court in the country has relied upon this decision to support
the argument now advanced by Petitioner. However, the same Colorado
Court of Appeals in an apparent struggle to reconcile it with a more recent
decision did refer to this case. In People v. Davenport, No. 98CA2387
(Colo. App. 03-02-2000) the prosecution filed a petition under the Colorado
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Contraband Forfeiture Act seeking forfeiture of $23,000 of seized currency
which was allegedly used in the unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance. (A copy of this decision is contained in the Appendix herein).
The defendant's attorney filed a response to the forfeiture petition but failed
to pay a docket fee required by Colorado statute. The clerk accepted the
documents for filing and presented them to the court without the filing fee.
Defendant tendered the docketing fee as soon as the error was called to his
attention. The trial court acknowledged that the defendant had "filed" a
response but ordered it stricken because it was unaccompanied by the
necessary filing fee. The lower court then entered a default judgment in favor
of the state reasoning that the defendant had failed to file a response and had
failed to appear personally. The Court of Appeals made the following
statement:
Filing a response and paying the docket fee are two
distinct acts . . . a case cannot proceed to a final determination
until the fee is paid, but it is not improper for the court to allow
the party to pay the fee at a later time. Id. at 3.
The Colorado Court of Appeals also quoted prior authority which
stated, "Unless it is necessary to enforce procedural rules to protect
substantive rights, litigation should be determined on the merits, rather than
on technical application of procedural rules." The Court then noted:
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Defendant did violate a procedural rule by failing to pay the
docket fee at the time of filing. Therefore, if the trial court felt it was
necessary, a sanction could have been imposed. Imposition of
sanctions is a matter for the sound exercise of the trial court's
discretion. The inadvertent failure to pay a docket fee at the time of
filing, without any aggravating factor, does not constitute an extreme
circumstance. Therefore, we hold that striking the defendant's
response and entering a default was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 3.
In referring to its previous decision of Brokerhouse International the
Court then made the following interesting statement:
To the extent that Brokerhouse International Ltd. v. Bendelow.
952 P.2d 860 (Colo. App. 1998) might be interpreted to reach a
contrary conclusion, wefindit distinguishablefromthis case. In
Brokerhouse, the plaintiffs failure to perfect the commencement of the
action impacted the defendant's right to rely on the statute of
limitation. Here, the only impact on the prosecutor was to require him
to litigate his petition for forfeiture, and that fact, standing alone, does
not constitute harm or prejudice. Id. at 3.
It thus appearsfromthis later case that the Colorado Court of Appeals
attempted to narrow its Brokerhouse decision by stating that complaints not
accompanied by valid checks are only considered "not filed" in cases where
the statute of limitation can be asserted as a defense. In other words, a
litigant whofileda proceeding with a subsequently dishonored check who
was not facing a statute of limitation problem under the reasoning of the
Davenport decision could still maintain the valid commencement of action
date of the original filing. On the other hand, an identical litigant who filed
his action on the same day but who faced a statute of limitation defense could
20

not assert the Davenport reasoning because to do so would preclude an
affirmative defense of a defendant. Respondent Dipoma submits that this
explanation is not only illogical but would be a denial of equal protection
under any state or federal constitution. The validity of afilingand the
compliance with state and court rules should have no relation to the defenses
that a defendant may later be able to assert.
The petitioner McPhie relies upon several casesfromother state
jurisdictions in which a complaint was apparently accepted by the clerk
without a fee being tendered but the fee was paid on a later date. In this case,
thefilingfee was in fact paid and accepted by the court clerk in the form of a
check and the complaint was dulyfiled,stamped and assigned a case number.
This undisputed factual scenario, therefore, is completely different from the
cases relied upon by the petitioner in Boostrom, De-Gas, and Wanamaker,
petitioner's Brief pp. 11-14.
Petitioner McPhie again distorts the facts in this case by claiming that
Dipoma failed to "properly pay thefilingfee at the time the complaint was
delivered." (Petitioner's Brief at 14). Apparently, Petitioner does not
consider a check to be a form of payment and essentially argues that Dipoma
was somehow able to talk the clerks intofilingher complaint without the
offer of any funds whatsoever. This simply did not occur in the present case
21

and the clerks fully complied with Title 21 of the Utah Code in requesting
Dipoma to make payment before thefilingwas accepted. There is nothing
contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals which would mislead any
litigant into believing that they could attempt to file a complaint without
attempting to tender payment in accordance with the statutory schedule.
Finally, the only "Pandora's Box" with respect to this case is the
demons which the petitioner has envisioned will exist under the straightforward analysis of the Court of Appeals discussing an extremely limited
problem in the specific context of a statute of limitation expiration and a
dishonored check.

n.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
APPLIED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
IN ANALYZING THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH CODE AND RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
Next the petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals failed to follow
normal rules of statutory construction in interpreting Rule 3 and Title 21.
(Petitioner's Brief at 16-19). Again, a close analysis of the arguments made
by the petitioner does not support the assertions being made.
For example, Petitionerfindsfault with the decision of the Court of
Appeals in using analogy to rules and cases involving appellate docketing
22

fees. (Petitioner's Brief at 17). It is interesting to note, however, that in the
trial court and in the Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued these very same
cases in his effort to show that appellate administrative fees were analogous
to initialfilingfees. (See "Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 4; Brief of Appellee, pp. 11-13).
Respondent in her Brief to the Court of Appeals below closely
analyzed the cases relied upon by the petitioner and showed conclusively that
the statutory history in fact supported Dipoma's position. (Brief of Appellant
at 14-17; Reply Brief of Appellant at 5). The Court of Appeals essentially
adopted the analysis of Dipoma in its opinion paragraphs 10-17.
It could be argued using Petitioner's logic that Appellate Rule 3 which
expressly provides failure to pay the docketing fee is not jurisdictional and
Appellate Rule 14(b) which provides that the court clerk may not accept a
petition unless the docketing fee has been paid are extraneous language in
light of Title 21-l-5(h) which establishes thefilingfee for appellate
jurisdiction. Under Petitioner's argument, these series of statutes 21-1-1,
21-1-5 and 21-7-1 would dismiss a litigant's appeal if the docketing fee was
not properly paid on the date that the jurisdictional time for the appeal
expired.
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In reality, however, it is extremely unlikely that petitioner McPhie
would take this absurd argument. Clearly, the plain language of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure in dealing with fees and jurisdiction overcome the
general language relating to the collection of fees by court clerks. Since
Petitioner wishes to talk about rules of statutory construction it might be well
to remember the principle that where the operation of two statutory provisions
is in claimed conflict, the more specific provision will govern over that which
is more general. Bittle v. Washington Terrace City, 993 P.2d 875 (Utah
1999). As further noted by this Court in Jensen v. IHC, 944 P.2d 327 (Utah
1997):
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the
same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which
applies. In doing this, we follow the general rules of statutory
construction, which provide both that "the best evidence of legislative
intent is the plain language of the statute" . . . and that "a more specific
statute governs instead of a more general statute." (Citations omitted).
Id. at 331. (Emphasis added).
Applying this principle to the instant case clearly shows that Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which specifically applies to the
commencement of an action must govern any alleged dispute when compared
with Title 21 relating to general obligations of government employees and
state fees. The very limited question of when an action commences for the
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purpose of determining a statute of limitation defense must be controlled by
the rules governing the courts and not rules governing all state employees.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the analogous statutory and
case law in deciding this matter in favor of the respondent Dipoma.
III.
UNTIL THE LEGISLATURE FORBIDS THE USE
OF PERSONAL CHECKS FOR THE PAYMENT
OF STATE FEES SUCH A PAYMENT IS VALID
AND CONSTITUTES A LEGITIMATE PAYMENT
OF A FEE AT THE TIME THE CHECK IS MADE.
In the instant case the plaintiff clearly paid the correctfilingfee to the
District Court Clerk. This is, therefore, not an instance where no filing fee
was tendered or where an incorrectfilingfee was paid. The Utah statutes and
rules do not require certified funds or cash to pay the numerous fees required
in litigation. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the clerk will
accept cash, personal checks, or credit cards to meet these statutory
requirements. In addition, a person claiming impecuniosity canfilean
affidavit of such and still be allowed tofilethe documents with no form of
money being tendered.
If the legislature intended the payment of the fee to be of such a
significant event that it may deprive a litigant of his right to seek court redress
or appellate review, the legislature clearly would have required certified funds
25

or cash. Even with certified cashiers' checks, however, there have been
instances where they are dishonored by a bank for various reasons including
theft or forgery.
Personal checks are a normal means of paying obligations ranging from
grocery bills to car repairs and under the Uniform Commercial Code are an
accepted form of payment for goods and services. However, personal checks
may be dishonored by a bank for a number of reasons completely outside of
the control of the check issuer. For example, the check may be returned for
insufficient funds because the issuer relied upon a depositfroma third party
which itself was later dishonored. The court can take judicial notice of this
domino effect which occurs daily in personal and corporate affairs.
In addition, a check may be dishonored because of a bank mistake such
as the failure to correctly print electronic numbers on the check or in a
mistake as to the amount of balance shown in a person's account. In essence,
therefore, the legislature never intended to take away critical judicial rights
from an innocent person whose check is not honored for many reasons
outside of their personal control. A check may also be dishonored because of
a mathematical mistake or the failure to register a transaction by the check
writer. Should these common mistakes be allowed to deny a litigant his day
in court?
26

The judicial clerks today do not treat a dishonored check as the voiding
of the document for which it was presented. In this case, for example, the
clerk sent to the plaintiff a notice that the check had been dishonored and a
request for certified funds. While petitioner was notified by the clerk that
penalty fees were assessed for the returned check, there was no declaration
that thefilingof the complaint would be voided.
The allowance of the use of personal checks which are subject to
dishonor is no different than the allowance of affidavits of impecuniosity
which are also subject to denial. Numerous state and federal cases hold that
in instances where a request for waiver offilingfees is made by a litigant but
is later denied by the court, that the person is entitled a reasonable time to file
the fee and to maintain the original action as if the fee had been paid. See
Jarrett v. U.S. Sprint Communication Co., 22 F.3d 256 (10th Cir. 1994);
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 1996); Gilardi v.
Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987) and Rodgers v. Bowen, 790 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1986); Fraser v. The Colorado Board of Parole, 931 P.2d 560
(Colo. App. 1996).
Constitutional equal protection would be violated if persons claiming to
be impecunious were given advantages over those who paidfilingfees but
whose checks were later returned. Clearly, an impecunious applicant is
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allowed to conditionally file a complaint with the clerk's complete knowledge
that judicial permission may not be given for many days after and may be out
rightly denied requiring actual payment. The same possibly of a conditional
payment exists with a check which is later dishonored. In both instances,
however, thefilingfee matter should not affect the validity of the timely filing
of the document.
Even assuming arguendo as the petitioner contends that the payment of
afilingfee is a necessary prerequisite to determine when a statute of
limitation time is calculated, the question remains in this case what effect
does payment by check have upon this requirement. Using Petitioner's logic,
for example, would delay the actualfilingdate of any complaint by several
days since even checks that clear with no problem do not fund the state
account on the date of the filing. In some instances, a check may require a
week before funds are actually poured into the District Court' account.
Should thefilingdate, therefore, be adjusted to the actual day that funds are
received into the Clerk's account?
Clearly, such a delayed calculation would be absurd and not based
upon any rule or statute. This same principle is equally applicable to
dishonored checks. In other words, for purposes of Petitioner's argument it is
immaterial whether a good check requires three days to clear or whether a
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bad check requires seven days to make good the funds. In both cases neither
date is the date that the complaint isfiledand date stamped.
As previously noted if the legislature and the supervisory courts of this
state wish to require that payment of actual funds be made concurrently with
thefilingof a complaint then the various rules and statutes should require
cash be paid. The use of certified funds, checks, or credit cards all require a
time delay in the actual receipt of funds into the Clerk's account.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION DOES
NOT IMPOSE AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN
ON GOVERNMENT AND DOES NOT GIVE THE
GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL DISCRETION
WHERE NONE WAS INTENDED.
Petitioner devotes a major portion of his brief to describe the
conjectured consequences which the Court of Appeals decision will create
within the Utah court system and, in fact, within the entire government system
of Utah. (Petitioner's Brief at 20-25). These hypothetical projections are
intended to substitute a logical analysis of the decision by the Court of
Appeals for an emotional floodgate argument. A calm and thoughtful analysis
of this litigation dispels the specters raised by Petitioner. First, the Court of
Appeals in its decision in no way diluted the statutory obligation of court
personnel to receive fees. Instead, the Court focused upon the very narrow
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issue ofjurisdiction and concluded that the Rules of Civil Procedure govern
the general statutory language concerning the collection of fees. The decision
did not negate any duty imposed upon court clerks or other state personnel.
Second, the facts of this case specifically involve the presentation of a
valid check which was later dishonored. A "payment" was in fact made to
the Clerk of the Court and was accepted. This is not a case in which Dipoma
attempted tofileher documents without making any effort for payment or
paid an incorrect amount. In those cases in other jurisdictions where clerks
did accept pleadings without payment either by mistake or design, those
filings are considered filed on the date they were accepted by the clerk even
though a fee must be subsequently paid. In any event, the facts of this case
simply do not justify any expansion conjectured by the petitioner.
Third, the decision does not apply to any other government employees
who are not court clerks and only to the specific question of when jurisdiction
attaches to a complaint for purposes of a statute of limitation defense. The
alleged chaos to otherfieldsof government is again not supported by anything
in this litigation.
Next, Petitioner speculates that litigants will now utilize the Dipoma
case for some sinister advantage. Petitioner suggests that people will attempt
to use bad checks to file complaints or will simply demand that clerks file
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their complaints with no payment. However, since payment of fees has never
been excused by any court, any such action would only delay the inevitable
moment when payment had to be made or the matter dismissed under the
discretion given to each court.
Certainly, the decision in this case does not stand for the proposition
that a litigant can escape payment indefinitely but only focuses upon the very
narrow question of when jurisdiction attaches if the complaint happens to be
filed on the last day of the statute of limitations. Moreover, even today a
litigant can claim that he is impecunious, fill out an affidavit, have his
complaint filed, and later pay the filing fee after it is determined by a court
that he is not impecunious. Because such abuse is possible is no answer to
the ultimate question of why would a litigant do these deceptive acts merely
to avoid paying the filing fee at the time the complaint is presented to the
clerk.
The same argument now being made by Petitioner could have been
made when former Rule 73 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring payment
of fees for appeal as a prerequisite to jurisdiction was amended by Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure where such payment was not
jurisdictional. Since 1985 a litigant hypothetically could demand that a notice
of appeal be filed without the payment of a fee knowing that it was not a
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jurisdictional requirement. Apparently, district court clerks have been able to
deal with this problem successfully by either requiring the fee to be paid or
lodging the notice of appeal without the fee subject to the later discretion of
the appellate courts.
Finally, any arguments of dire predictions should be addressed to this
Court in its rule-making authority or to the state legislature if payment should
be a jurisdictional requirement at the time a complaint is filed. Perhaps the
petitioner should also address the question of why the payment for a
complaint under Rule 3(a)(1) is so critical if the Rules of Civil Procedure
under Rule 3(a)(2) allow the commencement of the action by merely serving
the defendant without any complaint having beenfiledor fee paid.
In summary, therefore, the arguments of Petitioner concerning the
catastrophe now waiting the courts and government of Utah is merely a veiled
attempt to protect himselffromhaving to defend a lawsuit of liability caused
by his own negligence. Petitioner's only concern is to eliminate the
substantive case of Dipoma on its merits by hoping that the unfortuitous
circumstance of a dishonored check will buy him hisfreedomfromlitigation.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals and this Court should not allow the payment of
afilingfee to be used as a weapon to destroy Dipoma's day in court.
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V.
THE ULTIMATE GROUNDS OF UNREASONABLE
DELAY BY DIPOMA HAS BEEN WAIVED BY
PETITIONER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THIS COURT.
In the final attempt to escape liability in this matter Petitioner argues
that even if the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct and that a filing fee
is not jurisdictional that nevertheless the actions of Dipoma were
unreasonable as a matter of law and the case should be dismissed.
(Petitioner's Brief at 16-32). The petitioner makes many factual statements
as to what allegedly occurred during the District Court proceedings but does
so only upon docketing dates contained in the record.
The petitioner fails to mention that the reasons for the actions or
inactions of Dipoma are not contained in the trial record because Petitioner
failed to assert reasonableness in the court below. Instead, the sole grounds
argued by the petitioner in the trial court was that the payment as a matter of
law was defective thereby allowing the statute of limitation defense to attach.
No effort was made by the petitioner to take evidence below as to the facts
and circumstances of the delayed payment upon which Petitioner now relies.
It goes without citation that a party who does not assert a claim waives
it on appeal. The dissent in Dipoma urged that Dipoma's actions in failure to
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pay the filing fee was unreasonable as a matter of law and that therefore the
decision of the lower court should have been affirmed even though that
ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its
ruling.
Before this appellate rule of view may be utilized, however, the ground
or theory must be "apparent on the record." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1260 (Utah 1998); State v. Finlayson, 2000 Ut. 10 (Utah 01-14-2000).
There is nothing in this record to establish the factual basis of whether
Dipoma's actions were reasonable or unreasonable. This Court has stated,
"What constitutes a reasonable time 'is a question of fact to be determined
from all of the attendant circumstances.'" Russell v. Park City Corp., 506
P.2d 1274 (Utah 1973). The Court of Appeals in Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d
360 (Utah App. 1996) specifically stated, "What constitutes a 'reasonable
time' for payment is a question of fact...."
All of the cases relied upon by the petitioner involve reviews of factual
records concerning the actions or inactions of litigants in paying or not paying
filing fees. Even when it is decided as a matter of law that an action is
unreasonable such decision still must be based upon a factual record and not
upon mere conjecture. Here, for example, there is no record as to what
Dipoma was told by the clerk's office when she received notice of her
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dishonored check, what policy or rule prevented the clerkfromaccepting a
second checkfromDipoma when offered, and what occurred in Dipoma's life
in the way of health or other circumstances which may have prevented her
from paying the fee after her second attempt was rejected.
Certainly, these questions could easily have been determined by the
lower court had the petitioner merely asked for an evidentiary examination of
Dipoma and court personnel. Petitioner chose to put all of his eggs in the
basket which was decided by the lower court as a matter of law and therefore
cannot in this appeal bring up a defense which was not raised below and
which has no factual basis that would allow an appellate court to make a
decision.
For this reason, therefore, the question of "reasonableness" should not
be an issue in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the well-reasoned decision of the Court of
Appeals should be affirmed.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2000.

Craig S. Codk
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant,
Respondent
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Paul N. Belnap, Attorney for Defendant, Appellee and Petitioner, 6th Floor, Boston
Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 4th day of
December, 2000.
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The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
Darel Wayne Davenport, Jr.,
Respondent-Appellant
Mary Ann Lucero Dipoma,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Brian McPhie, and Does 1 through 20,
Whose True Names are Unknown,
Defendants and Appellees

2/34/2000

.3:53

3014852925

:RAIG 200KPC

PAGE

07

httpv-vvxvw vertuslmv ^•plweh-cgi'fast. .029060 -3^AAA-%28952%26P%2E2d%26860%2'

People v. Davenport. No. 98CA2387 (Colo.App. 03/02/2000)
[1 ]

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

[2]

No. 98CA2387

[3]

2000.CO.0042062 <http://www.verauslaw.com>

[4]

March 2. 2000

f5]

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
V.
DAREL W\YNE DAVENPORT, JR.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

[6]

Appeal from the District Court of Routt County Honorable Joel S. Thompson. Judge No.
98CV95

[7]

Paul R. Mclimans. District Attorney, Kathryn Steelman, Deputy District Attorney,
Steamboat Springs, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee Edward R. Harris. Denver. Colorado,
for Respondent-Appellant

(8]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Nieto

[9]

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

[10]

Division I

[ 11J

Metzger and Ruland. J J.. concur

[ 12]

In this civil forfeiture action, defendant, Darel Wayne Davenport, Jr., appeals the default
judgment entered in. favor of the People. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[13]

The prosecution tiled a petition under the Colorado Contraband Forfeiture Act,
§§16-13-501 to 16-13-511, C.R.S. 1999, seeking forfeiture of $23, 000 of seized currency
which was allegedly used in the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.
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[14]

The trial court issued a citation which summoned defendant to a first appearance on a date
certain in order to show cause why the prosecution's petition for forfeiture should not be
granted. The citation warned defendant that a default judgment would be entered against
him "if you fail to file a response to the petition... or if you fail to appear personally or by
counsel at the first appearance." A copy of the citation was served on defendant by certified
mail.

[15]

The day before the first appearance date, the clerk of the trial court received from
defendant's attorney a response to the forfeiture petition, a motion to continue the forfeiture
proceeding until the conclusion of the criminal case, and a verified statement executed by
defendant asserting that the funds at issue were lawful proceeds from a legitimate
investment The docket fee required by §13-32-101, C.R.S. 1999, did not accompany the
documents. However, the clerk accepted the documents for filing and presented them to the
court. The prosecutor acknowledged to the court that before the hearing she had received a
copy of the documents filed by the defendant. Defendant asserts he tendered the docket fee
as soon as the error was called to his attention.

[16]

Neither defendant nor his counsel appeared at the first appearance hearing on the citation to
show cause* The trial court acknowledged that defendant had "filed" a response but ordered
it stricken because it was unaccompanied by the necessary filing fee. The court then entered
default judgment in favor of the people, reasoning that defendant had failed tofilea
response and had also failed to appear personally or through counsel Defendantfileda
motion to set aside the default judgment: that motion was denied. This appeal followed.

[17]

I.

[18]

Defendant argues that his failure to pay the docket fee at the time he filed his response was
not a sufficient basis for striking the response, and therefore, the trial court erred by striking
the response and entering default judgment against him. We agree.

[19]

Section 16-13-505(8) requires the court tofindthe defendant in default at the first hearing
unless he either files a response or appears in person or by counsel.

[20]

If any claimant to the property subject to a forfeiture action... is properly served with the
citation . . . and fails to appear personally or by counsel on the first appearance date or fails
tofilea response as required by this section, the court shall forthwith find said person in
default and enter an order forfeiting said person's interest in the property and distributing
the proceeds of forfeiture as provided in this part 5 (emphasis added). Section
16-13-505(8), CR.S. 1999,

[21]

Therefore, if defendant's response was improperly stricken, it was error to enter default
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judgment at thefirsthearing.
[22]

Filing a response and paying the docket fee are two distinct acts, Drennen v. Johnson, 65
Colo. 381. 176 P. 479 (1918). The case cannot proceed to a final determination until the fee
is paid, but it is not improper for the court to allow the party to pay the fee at a later time.
Carls Construction, Inc. v Gigliotti. 40 Colo. App. 535, 577 P,2d 1107 (1978).

[23]

"Unless it is necessary to enforce procedural rules to protect substantive rights, litigation
should be determined on the merits, rather than on technical application of procedural
rules." Watson v, Fenney. 800 P.2d 1373,1375 (Colo. App. 1990). Here defendant
attempted to comply with the statute. He sent his response to the court and to the
prosecutor. The prosecutor suffered no harm by the defendant's failure to timely pay the
docket fee.

[24]

Entry of default judgment is the harshest of all sanctions, and it should be used only in
extreme circumstances. Nagy v. District Court, "62 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988). Defendant did
violate a procedural rule by failing to pay the docket fee at the time of filing. Therefore, if
the trial court felt it was necessary, a sanction could have been imposed. Imposition of
sanctions is a matter for the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion. Nagy v District
Court, supra. The inadvertent failure to pay a docket fee ax the time of filing, without any
other aggravating factor, does not constitute an extreme circumstance. Therefore, we hold
that striking the defendant's response and entering a default judgment in the circumstances
here was an abuse of discretion.

[25]

To the extent that Broker House International. Ltd. v. Bendeiow. 952 PJd 860 (Colo. App,
1998). might be interpreted to reach a contrary conclusion, wefindit distinguishable from
this case. In Broker House, the plaintiffs failure to perfect the commencement of the action
impacted the defendant's right to rely on the statute of limitations, Here, the only impact on
the prosecutor was to require him to litigate his petition for forfeiture, and that fact,
standing alone, does not constitute harm or prejudice.

[26]

n.

[27]

The prosecutor asserts that even if the response was timely filed, default judgment was
proper because §16-13-505(8), C.R.S. 1999, requires that the defendant file a response and
appear at thefirsthearing. Therefore, the prosecutor argues that the failure to appear at the
first hearing in person or by counsel justified entry of default.

[28]

The unambiguous language of § 16-13-505(8) imposes alternative, not cumulative,
requirements, and in that circumstance we must apply the statute as written. See
Department of Corrections v. Nieto.
P.2d
(Colo. No. 97SC876, February 14,
2000). Accordingly, defendant may satisfy the statute by eitherfilinga response or
appearing, and he chose the former. Therefore, the prosecutor's argument must be rejected.
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[29]

in.

[30]

Because of our conclusions, we need not reach the question of the applicability of C.R.C.P,
55 to a forfeiture proceeding under the Colorado Contraband Forfeiture Act.

[31]

Accordingly, the default judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

[32]

JUDGE METZGER and JUDGE RULAND concur.
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Dipoma v. McPhie. 2000 UT App 130 (X'lah App. 05/04/2000)
fl]
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[6]

Attorneys: Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant Paul M. Belnap and Darren K.
Nelson. Salt Lake City, for Appellees

[7]

Before Judges Greenwood. Bench, and Orme.

[8]

The opinion of the court was delivered b>: Greenwood, Presiding Judge

[9]

OPINION (For Official Publication)

[10]

Third District, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Judith S. Atherton

[31]

fl

Appellant, Mary Ann Lucero Dipoma. appeals from the trial court's dismissal of her
action for failure to properly fie her complaint with the required filing fee within the
applicable statute of limitation period. We conclude Dipoma's action was timely filed and.
therefore, reverse.

[12]

BACKGROUND »fal

[13]

f2 On November 24,1997, Dipoma filed a pro se complaint against Brian McPhie seeking
damages for injuries she sustained in a traffic accident on November 29, 1993. At the time
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she filed the complaint, Dipoma submitted a personal check for payment of the filing fee.
The check was returned to the clerk of the court tor insufficient funds on December 29,
1997-after the applicable four-year statute of limitation had run. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25 (1996). The record does not disclose when the court clerk notified Dipoma that
her check had been returned. The record does reflect, however, that Dipoma attempted to
pay with another personal check on March 10, 1998. The court clerk would not accept the
check and informed Dipoma that she must pay "with another form." According to the
record, Dipoma paid the filing fee on August 11.1998. A summons was issued on August
13,1998 and McPhie was served on August 26.1998, almost nine months after the statute
of limitation had run. Dipoma has aot submitted anything to suggest she was unable to pay
the filing fee.

[14]

"3 McPhie moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dipoma had not commenced her
action within the applicable four-year statute of limitation because her complaint was not
"filed" until August 11. 1998. when she paid the required fee. The trial court granted
McPhie's motion on May 12. 1999. holding thai a complaint accompanied by a check later
returned for insufficient funds is not filed for purposes of satisfying a statute of limitation.
Dipoma filed a timely notice of appeal on June 10. 1999.

[15]

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[16]

H Dipoma claims the trial court erred in determining she had not filed her action within the
applicable statute of limitation. McPhie argues that even if the trial court erred in
dismissing Dipoma's action based on her failure to pay the fee prior to the lapse of the
limitation period, we should affirm the trial court on the alternative ground that Dipoma did
not tender the filing fee within a reasonable time. These issues present questions of law
which we review for correctness. See Gerbich v. Numbed Inc., 1999 UT 37,f 10, 977 P.2d
1205; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 936 (Utah 1994). This court may affirm a lower court's
ruling on any alternative ground "'even though that ground or theory was not identified by
the lower court as the basis of its ruling.'" State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269*5 n.2, 987
P.2d 1284 (citation omitted).

[17]

ANALYSIS

[ 18]

Whether Filing Fees Are Jurisdictional

[19]

f 5 McPhie argued and the trial court agreed that the Utah Code requires the payment of
filing fees prior to the commencement of an action. On this basis, the trial court determined
that the Legislature intended filing fees to be a jurisdictional prerequisite for commencing
an action. For this case, die applicable portion of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure states: "A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a complaint with the court...
." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a)(1). McPhie argues that "filing" in Rule 3 incorporates sections
21-1-1. 21-1-5 and 21-7-2 of the Utah Code which set forth the court clerk's duties and
required filing fees. Because these sections require that the court clerk collect filing fees in
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advance of performance of services, McPhie claims that payment of filing fees is a
jurisdictional requirement. On the other hand, Dipoma argues that Rule 3 neither expressly
incorporates these sections nor contains any language requiringfilingfees, and thus paying
filing fees is not a jurisdictional requirement to commence an action.
r

6 Section 21-1-1 states*. Tor services performed in their respective offices, the officers
named in this chapter shall collect in advance for the use and benefit of the stare the fees
hereinafter enumerated and such other fees as may be provided by law." Utah Code Ann. §
21-1-1 (1998). Like section 21-1-1, section 21-7-2 mandates that state and county officers
collect fees in advance of rendering any sendee: "The state and county officers mentioned
in this title may not perform any official sendee unless the fees prescribed for that service
axe paid in advance.' Id, § 21-7-2(l)(a). Section 21-l-5(l)(a) sets forth the required fee for
commencing an action: "The fee for filing any civil complaint or petition invoking the
jurisdiction of a court of record not governed by another subsection is $120/' Id, §
21-l-5(l)(a). Finally, section 2M-5(l)(cc) states: "all fees shall be paid at the time the
clerk accepts the pleading for filing or performs the requested sendee/1 Id. § 21-l-5(l)(cc)
(Supp. 1999),
<7 Utah courts have not addressed whether filing fees are jurisdictional at the trial court
level Other state and federal courts, however, have addressed the interplay between Rule 3
andfilingprovisions with differing results. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals
addressed this issue under the same factual context-improper payment of fees due to a
check drawn on insufficient funds. See Broker House Intl Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 PJd 860,
862-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). Similar to Utah, Coloradofs rules of civil procedure are
modeled after the federal rules- and Colorado has a statute which requires payment of fees
at the time a complaint is filed. See id. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that
under this statutory scheme, a complaint accompanied by an insufficient funds check is not
filed for purposes of satisfying the applicable statute of limitation. See id. at 863.
f 8 Like Colorado, other courts have determined thatfilingfees are jurisdictional and have
noted the distinction between filing fees at the trial court level as opposed to the appellate
level. See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 713 F. Supp. 533, 538 (N.D.N, Y.
1989), affd, 108 F.3d 462,465 (2nd Cir. 1997) (discussing the distinction and finding that
under federal rules failure to pay fee is jurisdictional); Keith v. Heckler, 603 F. Supp. 150,
156-57 (E.D.Va. 1985) (same); De- Gas, Inc. v. Midland Resources, 470 So. 2d 1218,1222
(Ala. 1985) (same under Alabama rules of procedure); Boostrom v. Bach, 622 N.E.2d 175,
176-77 (Ind. 1993) (same under Indiana rules of procedure). While courts have held that
docketing fees are not jurisdictional at the appellate level, *fn2 Wanamaker, Keith, De-Gas,
and Boostrom have distinguished filing fees at the trial court level from fees on appeal
based on the procedural differences in commencing an action as opposed to appealing a
judgment or order. Significantly, one court stated:
Authorizing the commencement of the district court action without the required fee would
breed countless administrative and procedural woes, and give to the Clerk's Office an
element of discretion where none was intended. The ClerkTs Office could be converted into
a part-time credit institution, spending significant energy collecting fees as well as
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extending credit. Keith, 603 F. Supp. at 157.
[24]

Furthermore, one court commented that requiring filing fees at the trial court level
discourages parties from filing frivolous complaints. See De-Gas, 470 So. 2d at 1220.

[25]

f9 Nevertheless, the majority of courts considering this issue have concluded that
prepayment of filing fees is not jurisdictional at the trial court level. For example, a Kansas
federal district court examined the issue under the federal rules of civil procedure in
conjunction with local rules for the District of Kansas, and determined that while 28 U.S.C.
§ 1914(a) uses the word "shall,'' it does not state when the fee is required. See Burnett v.
Perry Mfg. Inc., 151 F.R.D. 398.402 (D. Kan. 1993). The court stated "[w]hen read with
28 U.S.C, § 1914(c), in which Congress allows each district court to require b> rule
advance paymtrt of fees, it seems clear that Congress did not intend by 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) to require parties to pre-pay the fee," Id. Because the Kansas district had no local
rule requiring the prepayment of fees* the court concluded that prepayment was not a
jurisdictional requirement. See id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that
"[although there is a split among federal courts, the greater weight of authority indicates
that the filing fee requirement is not jurisdictional," Td. at 401 (citations omitted); cf. Jarrett
v. US Sprint Communications Co., 22 F.3d 256, 258-59 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing split
between circuits and finding "district court authority supporting either argument").

[26]

r

[27]

«11 Prior to 1985, Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governed filing appeals.
Rule 73 stated, in relevant part:

[28]

"A party may appeal from a judgment byfilingwith the district court a notice of appeal,
together with sufficient copies thereof for mailing to the Supreme Court and all other
parties to the judgment. [2] and depositing therewith the fee required for docketing the
appeal in the Supreme Court." Prowswood, 676 P,2d at 954-55 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
73) (alteration in original). After setting forth these two requirements, Rule 73 stated:
"Tailure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the
judgment appealed from does not effect the validity of the appeal
"' Id. at 958 (quoting
Utah R, Civ. P. 73(a)) (omission in original).

10 Utah appellate courts have not addressed whetherfilingfees are jurisdictional in order
to commence an action, but our courts have examined whether fees are jurisdictional on
appeal. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 700 P 2d 1125,1129 n.l (Utah 1985); Prowswood, Inc.
v. Mountain Fuel Supplv Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955, 958 (Utah 1984); In re Estate of Ratliff,
19 Utah 2d 346.431 P.2d 571, 573 (Utah 1967), Jacobsen v. Jeffries. 86 Utah 587,47 P.2d
892, 893 (Utah 1935) (per curiam); Bunch v. Englehom. 906 P.2d 918, 919 (Utah Ct, App.
1995): Hausknect v. Industrial Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683. 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert,
granted. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), dismissed by, 938 P.2d 248 (Utah 1996), While not
controlling on this precise issue, these cases are instructive in their reasoning. Importantly,
Utah courts have consistently looked to the plain language of the statutes and rules when
construing them. See Hausknect. 882 P.2d at 685 (declining to read additional language
into rule).
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[29]

*12 In Prows wood, our supreme court determined that this language expressly made the
notice of appeal and docketing fee requirements jurisdictional and thefarthersteps
non-jurisdictional Id. The Prows wood court distinguished Rule 73fromRule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rule 3 sets forth only the requirement that
appellant must file a notice of appeal, and then states: 'Tailure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the appeal
'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)). The court
concluded that, unlike Rule 73. which required both notice and the docketing fee, Federal
Rule 3 required only the timelyfilingof the notice of appeal See id.

[30]

f 13 Utah Supreme Court opinions preceding Prowswood also construed Rule 73 to require
payment of the docketing fee as a prerequisite to commencing an appeal The court held:
'"Leaving a paper with afilingofficer, a fee for the filing of which is by statute required to
be paid in advance, is not a filing.'" Ratlift 431 P.2d at 573 (quoting Jacobsen. 47 P.2d at
893), Because Rule 73 contained express language requiring payment of the docketing fee.
the court interpreted Rule 73 as consistent with the statute that required court clerks to
collect tees in advance. See id.

[31]

r

[32]

115 Finally, in Hausknect. this court addressed the question of whether payment of
docketing fees is a jurisdictional requirement for an appealfroman administrative order
under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 14(b) states:

[33]

"At the time of filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the
clerk of the appellate court suchfilingfees as are established by law, and also the fee for
docketing the appeal The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless thefilingand
docketing fees axe paid." Id. at 684 (quoting Utah R, App. P. 14(b)).

[34]

The appellant in Hausknect argued that, like Rule 3. Rule 14 does not mandate the payment
of fees in advance as a jurisdictional requirement. See id. After noting that Rule 3 expressly
states that failure to pay fees does not affect the validity of an appeal we noted that Rule 14
contains different language than Rule 3 and mandates that fees are "a prerequisite to
acceptance of a petition for review by the clerk of the appellate court." Id. at 685.
Specifically, we stated: "Language limiting the jurisdictional effect of failure to comply is

l 4 Shortly after the Prowswood decision, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure which became effective on January 1, 1985. Examining Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which replaced Rule 73, the supreme court held;
"Under Rule 3. the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court to this Court
is no longer jurisdictional" ^ M State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125,1129 n.l (Utah 1985).
Appellate Rule 3, which is modeled after the federal rule distinguished in Prowswood,
contains no reference to payment of fees at the time offilingas a jurisdictional requirement.
See Hausknect. 882 P,2d at 685 n J.
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notably absentfromRule 14. and we decline to read it into the rule." Id.
HI 6 Unlike Rule 14. Rule 3 contains no specific reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional
necessity nor does it incorporate sections 21-1-1.21-1-5 or 21-7-2 of the Utah Code as
jurisdictional requirements. The plain language of Rule 3 merely requires that a plaintiff
"file" a complaint with the court clerk. Reference to filing fees as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to commencing an action is "notably absent" from Rule 3, and "we decline to
read it into the rule." Id. Sections 21-1-1,21-1-5, and 21-7-2 are merely directive to court
clerks. If. as occurred in this case, a plaintiff submits a complaint with a personal check and
the clerk accepts the complaint prior to the lapse of the applicable statute of limitation, the
complaint is filed for purposes of Rule 3. regardless of whether the check is later returned
for insufficient funds. As a practical matter, sections 21-1-1,21-1-5 and 21-7-2 dictate that
filing fees be paid at the time the complaint is filed in order to be accepted by the court
clerk, but this is not a jurisdictional requirement.

«17 Accordingly, in the absence of plain language making filing fees jurisdictional, we
decline to read such a requirement into the statute. In the case of a check returned for
insufficient funds, such a reading could potentially lead to a harsh, unintended result. A *
check can be returned for insufficient funds for a multitude of reasons-some of which are
beyond the payor's ability to control. While no evidence was submitted in this case to
suggest such a problem, a potential plaintiff should not have his or her case dismissed due
to bank error or some other problem beyond their control. The argument that courts should
not act as collection agencies is likewise unpersuasive and cannot be used to trump the
plain meaning of the rule. Our courts assess fees for a myriad of different reasons, and, as
explained at oral argument, typically assess a fee for bounced checks. Collecting on a
bounced check would neither add a significant burden to a clerk's typical duties, nor would
it rum the court into a credit agency. Because Rule 3 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only
requires a plaintiff to file a complaint in order to commence an action, the trial court erred
in dismissing Dipoma's action for failure to tender the required fee prior to the lapse of the
applicable statute of limitation.

Whether Dipoma Paid Within Reasonable Time
«;t8 McPhie argues mat even if filing fees are not jurisdictional, we should affirm the trial
court's dismissal because Dipoma's payment of her filing fee nine months after it was due
was unreasonable. McPhie raises this argument for the first time in his brief to this court.
Generally. M[t]o preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue
before the trial court." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125.129 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); see Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc.,
960 P.2d 904,906 n.3 (Utah 1998). It is true, as the dissent suggests, that we may latch on
to a new ground if, on that basis, it is possible to affirm the trial court. The new ground
does not offer such an opportunity here. The record does not include any indication that the
court gave Dipoma a deadline for submitting her fee, making it difficult to see how her
eventual payment, which was accepted by the clerk without incident, was not made within
a reasonable time under the circumstances. *fh4 Furthermore, we see no reason why the
court could not issue a notice or order directing a plaintiff to submit the required fee by a
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certain date or face dismissal of the action.
CONCLUSION
1fl9 We determine that the plain language of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
contains no requirement that filing fees be paid prior to commencing an action to vest a
trial court with jurisdiction and avoid running of a statute of limitation. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court's dismissal of Dipoma's action.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge
^201 CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
BENCH. Judge (concurring and dissenting);
f211 agree with the portion of the main opinion holding that payment of the filing fee is
not jurisdictional. I disagree, however, with the main opinion's determination that we
cannot reach the alternative basis for affirmance presented by appellee because it was not
raised below. This position is contrary to Utah case law; which provides:
"The appellate court will affirm the judgment; order, or decree appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground
or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and
this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee,
was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court."
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222,461 P>2d 290? 293 n.2 (1969)
(emphasis added) (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1)). Thus, under controlling
Utah law. an alternative ground for affirmance need not be raised in or considered by the
trial court, Accordingly, we must address the alternative ground for affirmance that
appellee has presented on appeal.
<J22 Appellant attempted to pay the filing fee by personal check when she filed her
complaint on November 24. 1997. The check was returned to the court clerk for insufficient
funds on December 29. 1997. It is unclearfromthe record exactly when appellant received
notice that her check had bounced. It may have been as early as December, but it was
certainly no later than March 10.1998, This later date was when appellant attempted to pay
thefilingfee with a second check, but the court clerk insisted on another form of payment
because thefirstcheck had bounced. In any event, appellant allowed an additional five
months to elapse before shefinallypaid the filing fee on August 1L 1998. In my opinion.
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waiting more than five months to pay the filing fee after being informed that a check has
bounced is unreasonable, as a matter of law.
[48]

«23 I would therefore affirm the dismissal of the complaint on the alternative ground that,
after receiving notice that the original payment was returned for insufficient tunds, a
litigant must pay the mandatory filing fee within a reasonable time. See, e.g., Truitt v.
County of Wayne. 148 F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 1998) (waiting 120 days to pay filing fee
after receiving notice of denial of in forma pauperis application unreasonable);
Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ, 45 F.3d 161. 165 (7th Cir. 1995) (103 day delay
unreasonable): Jarrett v US Sprint Communications Co.. 22 F.3d 256,259 (10th Cir. 1994)
(five month delay unreasonable). Appellant clearly did not pay the filing fee in this case
within a reasonable time.

[49]

Russell W. Bench. Judge

Opinion Footnotes

[501

*fnl. The facts pertinent to the issues on appeal are undisputed.

[51]

*fi£ • See, e.g., Parissi v. Telechron. Inc., 349 U.S. 46,47? 75 S. Ct. 577, 577 (1955) (per
curiam) (holding that appellate fees are not jurisdictional): Finch v. Finch, 468 So. 2d 151.
154 (Ala. 1985) (same): Brady v. Eastern Indiana Prod. Credit Ass'n. 396 N.E.2d 335, 335
(bad. W8) (same).

[52]

*fti3 • Utah R. App. P. 3(a) provides: An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal...

[53]

*fii4 . The cases relied on by the dissent do not stand for the general proposition that if a
clerk accepts a complaint and files it, and later learns that a check for the filing fee bounced
and so advises plaintiff that plaintiff has only a reasonable time within which to bring in
alternate payment. Nor do they recognize delays in payment which, as a matter of law, are
of unreasonable duration based on length alone. Rather, these federal cases all turn on the
interplay of provisions of federal law and practice, including Title VH's ninety-day period
within which to sue after getting an EEOC right-to-sue letter and the practice of receiving
and retaining a complaint in the clerk's office but not officially filing it until payment is
received or in forma pauperis status secured. In each of these cases, the initial payment was
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made, and the complaint officially filed, only after the elapbe of ninety-days, as calculated
to include periods m which the deadline was toiled pending plaintiffs notification that in
forma pauperis status had been denied.
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